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The moral panic over sexual predators targeting young children is often 
expressed in the punishment of child pornography offenders. The federal 
government’s involvement began with its seminal statute criminalizing 
the commercial production of child pornography in the Protection of 
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.1 Since then, Congress 
has continued to express concern that child pornography remains a na-
tional problem that harms children and society.2 To that end, Congress 
has enacted numerous additional criminal statutes to cover nonproduc-
tion acts such as transportation, distribution, receipt, and possession of 
child pornography.3 Leveraging its constitutional power to regulate inter-
state commerce, the federal criminal justice system has expanded its juris-
dictional grasp over these crimes, which now are largely accomplished 
using online technologies and computer resources. The number of non-
production child pornography offenders sentenced in the federal system 
has increased exponentially, from six dozen in the year 19924 to almost 
1,800 in 2013.5
This book has outlined many areas in law and society in which crimes 
involving child pornography operate in special and usually contested man-
ners. This observation remains true in sentencing, in which the punish-
ment for child pornography represents perhaps the most controversial sen-
tencing scheme in the federal criminal system today. The dispute has pitted 
several robust institutions against each other. Congress and the federal ju-
diciary are vying for control over sentencing, and the agency created to 
foster mutual respect and uniform sentencing practices is struggling to 
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maintain its authority. Congress created that agency, the United States Sen-
tencing Commission (the “Commission”), almost thirty years ago. While 
Congress delegated significant policy authority to it and expected the 
agency to act as an independent expert body, Congress has since reminded 
everyone that the Commission is a subordinate operation.6 The legislature 
and the judiciary have a different, though equally complex, relationship in 
which each operates as a check against the authority of the other, with nei-
ther obtaining primary authority in sentencing law. The question about 
whether sentences should be founded upon empirical study— meaning the 
result of skillfully calculating actual sentencing practices— is also eliciting 
debate in legal circles. This chapter explores these political and empirical 
controversies, points out differences in ideologies and legal conclusions 
that underlie them, and provides descriptive information about recent fed-
eral child pornography offending and resulting sentences. The overall in-
consistency in sentencing across federal courts and, as will briefly be ad-
dressed, state sentencing schemes reflects differing definitional suppositions 
concerning the dangers child pornography viewers pose and the harms 
suffered by children and thus lead to differences in determining the appro-
priate proportionality of just punishments.
Federal sentencing Basics
Three important governmental organizations are at odds over the power 
to manage sentencing practices in the federal criminal justice system. 
Congress, the United States Sentencing Commission, and the federal judi-
ciary is each convinced of its own unique abilities to best judge culpability 
and to determine just punishments. As shall be addressed below, the de-
bate is at a head with respect to nonproduction child pornography crimes.7 
To begin, though, a summary of the history of federal sentencing is neces-
sary to set up the reasons for the recent controversy.
In the federal system, child pornography offenses have the potential to 
elicit long- term prison sentences. Transportation, distribution, and receipt 
offenses each trigger five- year mandatory minimum sentences and twenty- 
year maximums.8 Possession of child pornography does not trigger a man-
datory minimum but carries a maximum of ten years; if the material in-
volves a prepubescent child or a minor under the age of twelve, the 
maximum increases to twenty years.9 These sentences ratchet upward fur-
ther if the defendant has a history of criminal sexual abuse. The selection of 
a particular federal defendant’s sentence within those ranges is determined 
This content downloaded from 173.172.40.229 on Sat, 28 Jan 2017 13:30:02 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Revised Pages
Political and Empirical Controversies Threaten Federal Guidelines | 263
by a district judge subject to the constraints of statutory sentencing goals, 
the Commission’s sentencing policies and guidelines, and constitutional 
law. All these provide standards that are designed to assist district judges in 
determining reasonable sentences to impose upon offenders.
The current federal sentencing system was established by legislation 
aptly named the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which overhauled what 
was an indeterminate system in which judges had great discretion to a 
more determinative system limiting such flexibility. This law created the 
United States Sentencing Commission, an agency to be staffed with pro-
fessionals who would use their special expertise to craft uniform sentenc-
ing policies and guidelines. District court judges, essentially trial judges in 
the federal system,10 would retain the authority to assign sentences in in-
dividual cases, but they were to be substantially influenced by guidelines 
issued by the Commission concerning the severity of the appropriate pun-
ishment for the relevant crime. To this end, the Commission crafted 
guidelines intended to encompass a reasonable sentencing range based on 
the idea that not all crimes are committed alike. For example, not all rob-
beries are the same for the purpose of determining an appropriate punish-
ment to match the level of the resulting harm and the offender’s relative 
culpability. The goal was for the Commission to craft discrete sentencing 
ranges based on the offense committed, as modified by relevant facts or 
circumstances which the Commission determined either aggravated or 
mitigated culpability. These offense- related facts or circumstances are 
called specific offense characteristics (“SOCs”). Thus, under the guidelines 
the sentence calculation begins with a numeric base offense level for each 
type of crime (essentially a starting number), which represents the typical 
crime. Then points are added or subtracted for applicable SOCs, which 
increase or reduce the offense level based on facts related to the severity of 
the offense or the culpability of the offender. Basically, guidelines provide 
precise numerical methods for calculating final point totals, which are 
then matched against the defendant’s criminal history score on a guideline 
table to determine the relevant sentencing range. Thus, the guidelines are 
expected to normalize sentencing practices by offering a regimented pro-
cess to determine a recommended range of sentence. For example, the 
guidelines might indicate that a sentencing range of 100 to 125 months’ 
imprisonment (approximately 8 to 10 years) was proper for a defendant 
who committed a certain type of robbery; it would arrive at that calcula-
tion by adjusting the base offense level for robbery using relevant SOCs, 
and then matching the final offense level with the defendant’s criminal 
past on the guideline table.
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Originally, Congress intended that the Commission’s policies and 
guidelines would be presumptively binding on the courts. Yet the reform 
legislation itself contained two provisions that gave judges some flexibility. 
First, the law provided that federal judges retained some discretion to vary 
from a guidelines’ recommended range for a fact or circumstance that had 
not already been considered by the Commission.11 Second, the Commis-
sion’s policies and guidelines would not embody the only criteria to be 
considered. Another statutory provision instructed that in determining a 
reasonable sentence, the sentencing judge must consider not only the 
guideline range, but also the nature and circumstances of the offense; the 
history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence im-
posed considering the seriousness of the offense, retribution, deterrence, 
and protecting the public; and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 
disparities among like offenders (collectively, “sentencing factors”).12 This 
flexibility notwithstanding, federal judges complied with guidelines’ rec-
ommendations and abided by Commission policies a substantial majority 
of the time for nearly twenty years. Then, in 2005, the United States Su-
preme Court dealt the guidelines system a significant blow.13
In the landmark case of United States v. Booker, the United States Su-
preme Court rendered the guidelines advisory in nature, rather than pre-
sumptive, in order to remedy a constitutional issue with the mandatory 
nature of the federal guidelines structure.14 Pursuant to Booker, a district 
judge now can now deviate from a guideline’s recommended sentencing 
range if she determines that a different sentence is justified after consider-
ation of the sentencing factors. The Supreme Court in the Booker decision 
clearly permitted a sentencing judge to vary for a reason related to the 
particular facts and circumstances in the individual case. A couple years 
thereafter, the Supreme Court went a step further when it approved the 
ability of a district judge to vary from a guideline’s recommended range 
not due to any particular fact or circumstance relevant to the case at hand, 
but if the individual judge has a disagreement with a policy underlying 
that guideline.15 For example, the Supreme Court allowed a sentencing 
judge in Kimbrough v. United States to categorically disagree with the 
guideline for crack cocaine trafficking, which was far more punitive than 
the guidelines for other drugs, including powder cocaine.
Together, Booker and Kimbrough might be construed to render the 
Commission itself, as well as its policies and guidelines, largely irrelevant. 
To the contrary, in a series of cases since then, the Supreme Court has reaf-
firmed that federal judges remain significantly circumscribed by the Com-
mission’s policies and guidelines, though the ability to vary for the reasons 
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just mentioned survive.16 Thus a district judge is still required in the first 
instance to correctly calculate the guidelines’ range and also to consider 
Commission policies before considering whether to diverge from them 
after considering all of the sentencing factors.
As a result of Booker and Kimbrough, the compliance rate of issuing 
within- guideline sentences has continued to decrease in federal courts. 
The overall rate for within- range sentences fell from 72 percent to 51 per-
cent from 2004 to 2013.17 Notably, within- guideline sentences have de-
creased dramatically for child pornography offenses. The percentage of 
within- range sentences for child pornography offenses fell much farther, 
from 82 percent in 200418 to 31 percent in 2013.19 The direction of vari-
ances for child pornography sentencing is decidedly in one direction: 
downward variances in issuing sentences (often, very far) lower than 
guidelines recommendations. The rate of below- guideline penalties in 
child pornography cases was 13 percent in 200420 and increased substan-
tially to 68 percent in 2013.21
The current debate about child pornography sentencing has attracted 
widespread attention from various constituencies. In the last few decades 
Congress has regularly increased statutory maximum sentences and es-
tablished higher mandatory minimums specifically for child pornography 
crimes.22 Yet even with such numerical increases, Congress continues to 
be unsatisfied with the reduced sentences imposed by the judiciary in 
many cases. Thus, Congress has, on several occasions, statutorily required 
the Commission to make modifications specifically to the child pornogra-
phy guideline. These have included mandates of specific offense level in-
creases and changes to particular SOCs to enhance punishment.23 Sen-
tencing experts claim this is an unfortunate legislative intrusion into the 
operation of a purportedly independent agency and its expertise, an en-
croachment unique to child pornography crimes.24
The Commission itself is equally frustrated with the practices of 
courts and Congress in this regard. It has indicated its displeasure both 
with congressional edicts, which have changed the child pornography 
guideline, and with federal judges disregarding its mastery, which is ex-
emplified by both the decreasing rate of within- guideline sentences and 
the criticism expressed in sentencing opinions. For their part, numerous 
federal judges regularly balk at the increasing length of sentences that 
the child pornography guideline has produced over the years; many now 
perceive this guideline as glaringly unhelpful in guiding the judge in 
determining a reasonable sentence.25 To understand the judges’ frustra-
tion, it is necessary to outline the common reasons among the judiciary 
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and others for finding that the child pornography guideline’s recom-
mendations have become untenable.
Challenges to the Child Pornography Guideline
The controversies concerning the validity of the child pornography guide-
line converge upon several criticisms that are now oft repeated, at least by 
those who find fault. The discussion here will outline these common cri-
tiques, supplemented by certain numerical information derived from sta-
tistical analyses of the Commission data files for fiscal 2012 sentences.26 
First, the source of the child pornography guideline is at the heart of per-
haps the most visible complaint. Judges who have varied downward often 
criticize the guideline as not resulting from the Commission’s normal role 
as an independent agency conducting empirical study. Therefore, the ar-
gument continues, it cannot provide normative information about rea-
sonable and consistent sentences.27 Instead, the starting offense level and 
several of the SOCs were forced on the Commission by Congress.28 In-
deed, the Commission concisely describes this history in a comprehensive 
report on the evolution of the child pornography guideline:
Congress has repeatedly expressed its will regarding appropriate 
penalties for child pornography offenders. Congress has specifi-
cally expressed an intent to raise penalties associated with certain 
child pornography offenses several times through directives to the 
Commission and statutory changes aimed at increasing the guide-
line penalties and reducing the incidence of downward departures 
for such offenses.29
Congress’ penchant over the years to enact laws requiring fundamental 
changes to a specific offense guideline is virtually unprecedented. Its fixa-
tion on child pornography, a crime that has never made up more than 3 
percent of the federal system’s sentencing docket, is remarkable. Perhaps 
the allure of sex and violence involving the most protected segment of 
society— children— offers political advantage to support increasing sanc-
tions for people perceived as child sex offenders. Even though such direct 
congressional influence over the guidelines is unusual, the fact that nu-
merous judges eschew a guideline because of Congress’ role in its develop-
ment is not uncontroversial. That is because, as will be discussed further 
below, others believe that the ultimate authority over sentencing policy 
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ought to be reserved to Congress, whose judgments should overrule any 
contrary views of the Commission or individual judges.
The second dispute concerns adjustments to the child pornography of-
fense level. The current guidelines for child pornography offenses contain 
six categories of SOCs, which, if applied, can substantially increase the 
recommended length of imprisonment. Significantly, all the SOCs in this 
guideline are enhancements (rather than reductions). They include addi-
tional points for material involving prepubescent children or minors un-
der age twelve; the use of a computer; sadistic or violent content; distribu-
tion activity; the number of images; and a history of prior sexual abuse. 
One of the most common complaints among critics is that several of the 
SOCs apply in virtually every case.30 This is because most child pornogra-
phy offenders use a computer to download and trade images, and the ad-
vancement of technology permits the collection of a large trove of mate-
rial that likely will include very young children and violent content— even 
if the individual does not necessarily intend to collect those types of im-
ages. One problem with the high rate of applicability for multiple SOCs is 
that instead of acting as aggravating factors that isolate more heinous 
criminals, they merely represent the typical offender in contemporary 
times. Thus, the guideline fails to differentiate between more and less cul-
pable offenders.31
The observation that some of the SOCs are almost universally applied 
is borne out by 2012 sentencing statistics.32 At least 96 percent of defen-
dants received points related to the enhancements for the material involv-
ing a minor, the use of a computer, and the number of images. Four out of 
five defendants received an enhancement for the sadistic or violent con-
tent of the images. Just over half of defendants were assigned a distribution- 
related enhancement. However, just one in ten received points for a pat-
tern of activity of sexual abuse with children.
The problems associated with the SOCs exemplify the political and 
empirical focus of this chapter. Those SOCs that derive from Congress are 
not supported by any empirical study of actual sentencing practices. Fur-
ther, as the Commission’s report on the development of the child pornog-
raphy guideline attests, even those SOCs not required directly by Con-
gress are likewise not based upon any empirical analysis.33 Instead, the 
Commission appears open to embracing SOCs that derive merely from 
various commentators’ proposals. For example, the first two SOCs ad-
opted in the child pornography guideline, involving material depicting a 
minor under twelve and distribution activity (which remain in existence 
today), evidently were made simply at the request of a Department of Jus-
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tice representative. Another SOC change made shortly thereafter to trig-
ger an enhancement for material involving a prepubescent minor came 
from a suggestion by a lawyer for an antipornography interest group, 
without debate or discussion.
Third, a related problem with many of the SOCs commonly invoked is 
that they act to ratchet up sentencing ranges significantly. This leads to 
recommendations for lengthy sentences, which many judges find to be 
unreasonably high. It has been observed that the resulting ranges tend 
toward statutory maximums, meaning that the guideline fails to ade-
quately cover the full spectrum of potential minimum and maximum 
penalties, which again results in a failure to distinguish between various 
kinds of offending behavior.34 Some say it seems illogical that Congress 
would provide a statutory range of five to twenty years for most child por-
nography offenses, yet the guideline routinely leans toward recommenda-
tions around the maximum.35 Another method of articulating this criti-
cism is that the child pornography guideline results in unwarranted 
similarity (i.e., extremely harsh penalties) for dissimilar cases and, as 
mentioned earlier, fails to adequately distinguish the worst (justifying 
twenty years) from the least culpable offenders (deserving five years).36
The final category of complaint is that, overall, the child pornography 
guideline tends to yield recommendations that are higher than other 
guidelines would provide for actual sexual molestation of children.37 
Judges adopting this view argue that it is senseless to punish offenses in-
volving visual material more severely than actual contact crimes against 
children.38 They also often believe that the child pornography guideline is 
disproportionate with guidelines’ recommendations for other offenses. 
The guideline ranges tend to be longer for child pornography offenses 
than for such crimes as homicide, drug trafficking, and bank robbery.39
Individually and collectively, these criticisms have caused many federal 
judges to lose respect for this particular guideline, and the 2012 dataset 
analyses illustrate the problematic results. The 2012 sentencing data high-
light the practice of varying from guideline recommendations, while also 
showing the result of disparities nationwide. Overall, 35 percent of child 
pornography sentences in 2012 were within guideline range. Almost two- 
thirds of child pornography sentences actually issued (approximately 62 
percent) were below range. At the other extreme, slightly less than 3 per-
cent were above range. While the sentencing guideline itself would seem 
to assure similar sentences across all types of offenders, Booker and Kim-
brough have disrupted that result. Both decisions allow judges to reject the 
application of otherwise applicable SOCs and to vary from final ranges.
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Several additional statistical measures highlight the result of vari-
ances. The mean prison sentence of for child pornography crimes in 
2012 was ten years, which is not insignificantly lower than the mean 
guideline minimum sentence of over twelve years.40 Yet there was great 
variation in individual sentences, ranging from a low of probation to a 
maximum of a life sentence. On the low end of this punishment spec-
trum, one- third of defendants in 2012 were sentenced to five years or 
less. Three percent received one year or less of prison time, with 2 per-
cent receiving sentences of probation only. On the other end of the spec-
trum, 13 percent received sentences of at least twenty years. Separate 
regression analyses, not presented herein, also provide evidence of wide-
spread disparities across the country even after controlling for relevant 
factors. Thus, perhaps because of the criticisms that the guideline im-
properly tends toward maximum penalties across the board, federal 
judges are using their newfound powers to achieve gradations in culpa-
bility and sentencing.
There are further statistics suggesting that many sentencing judges— 
but not all— find that the guideline produces punishments that are rou-
tinely too high. Even for the 35 percent of sentences in 2012 that complied 
with the guideline recommendation, most were oriented toward the lower 
end of the range. Of those sentences that were within range, 70 percent 
were exactly at the absolute guideline minimum sentence, while another 
12 percent were within the lower half of the ranges. The combination of 
these statistical measures reveals two competing conclusions: First, there 
is a trend of deviating downward from this guideline. Second, there is also 
a lack of uniformity nationwide in complying with the guideline and, pos-
sibly, with the length of sentences actually issued.
Based usually on one or more of the foregoing complaints, judges often 
explain the basis of their downward variances as justified when consider-
ing all of the sentencing factors and the greater discretion afforded by the 
Booker ruling. The other common legal justification is that the child por-
nography guideline specifically deserves less deference and ought to be 
rejected as a matter of policy. This argument is tied to the Kimbrough deci-
sion referenced earlier. But whether Kimbrough legally permits such a 
policy rejection has resulted in inconsistent, indeed contradictory, conclu-
sions by district judges across the country. Many, but certainly not all, 
judges find that the child pornography guideline is faulty and therefore 
unreliable. To make matters worse, the circuit courts of appeal are divided 
on the relevant legal issue, which partly explains the lack of uniformity in 
sentencing.
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A Disputed Legal Question
Significant disparities in child pornography sentences may be related to an 
important legal disagreement among the federal courts that has emerged. 
The question is whether it is lawful for a district judge to vary from the 
guideline range based on a policy disagreement with the child pornogra-
phy guideline. This legal question arose after the Kimbrough decision, in 
which the Supreme Court permitted a district judge to disregard the 
guideline for crack cocaine offenses because the judge disagreed with the 
principal policy on which that guideline was based. The sentencing judge 
in Kimbrough thought that the Commission’s policy was unfounded be-
cause it was based not on any empirical study but on a highly questionable 
generic metric based on the weight of the drug. The Supreme Court’s Kim-
brough decision did not resolve two major issues that are now at the heart 
of the legal dispute in child pornography sentencing. One was whether a 
Kimbrough- type policy rejection is permissible for any other guideline 
that is not the product of the Commission’s own policy conclusion. More 
specifically, the question is whether a court may reject a guideline policy 
when the disputed policy was mandated by Congress itself. The other is-
sue is whether courts may reject only those guidelines that have not ben-
efited from the Commission’s empirical analysis. The reference to empiri-
cal analysis here refers to the expectation that the Commission would 
derive policies and guidelines only after undertaking statistical compila-
tions of average sentencing practices across the country for the offense or 
SOC at issue. To be sure, the formative legislation did not compel the 
Commission to write guidelines that merely replicated past practices; the 
agency was also tasked with considering whether such sentences properly 
reflected the culpability and harm caused by the relevant offense. Still, 
many believe the Commission ought to at least study judges’ decisions. To 
state this issue another way, the question is whether the ability to reject a 
guideline based on a categorical policy disagreement is limited to guide-
lines that do not reflect the Commission’s study of normative experiences.
Legal rulings about the legal authority for a sentencing judge to reject 
the child pornography guideline for a policy- based reason have varied 
across the country.41 Significantly, the federal courts of appeal have ad-
dressed this issue, resolving the question in three different ways. In one 
group, four circuits have explicitly denied lower courts the legal ability to 
reject the child pornography guideline for policy reasons.42 These courts 
have offered several reasons for their denials. They tend to view Congress’ 
involvement in the child pornography guideline as a reason to be respect-
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ful of the legislature’s view that such crimes are serious and ought to be 
severely punished.43 One appellate court clearly believes that the fact the 
child pornography guideline represents congressional will is a reason to 
consider Kimbrough as distinguishable and therefore inapplicable.44 That 
court explained that it is not legally permissible to reject the child pornog-
raphy guideline based on legislative influence because Congress maintains 
ultimate authority in setting sentencing policy.45 For three circuit courts 
in this group, the argument that sentencing policies ought to be based on 
empirical studies is unpersuasive, with the appellate judges noting that 
determinations of reasonable sentences never necessitated a statistical 
analysis.46 Another appellate court in this group concludes that the child 
pornography guideline cannot be rejected, but it offers a somewhat con-
flicting perspective, asserting this guideline actually was the subject of 
empirical support, though the court is unclear about the foundation for 
such assertion.47
On the other end of the spectrum is the group of appellate courts, also 
numbering four, that have explicitly condoned a policy- based rejection of 
the child pornography guideline.48 One appellate circuit construes Con-
gress’ involvement in directly and indirectly amending the child pornog-
raphy guideline as problematic because it undermines the Commission’s 
normal empirical study, leading the court to conclude that this guideline 
lacks credibility in guiding reasonable sentencing practices. Indeed, this 
court refers to the child pornography guideline as “eccentric,” of “highly 
unusual provenance, and “fundamentally different” than other guide-
lines.49 Another circuit is in substantial agreement. It points out that when 
a guideline fails to represent the Commission’s deliberative process and 
instead is substantively influenced by congressional directive, it deserves 
even less respect.50
The third group in the dispute on the legal authority to reject the child 
pornography guideline for policy reasons includes three circuits that have 
taken an equivocal stance.51 These courts theoretically accept the ability of 
a district judge to reject a guideline for policy reasons but at the same time 
they have expressed serious reservations about the prospect of rejecting 
the child pornography guideline. These circuits appear unwilling to adopt 
a definitive stance on the institutional clash, though they seem inclined to 
defer to Congress and the Commission. For instance, one court in this 
group opines that arguments that the child pornography guideline recom-
mends overly harsh sentences ought best to be addressed to the Commis-
sion or Congress, rather than the judiciary.52 Another circuit has expressed 
discomfort with the notion of rejecting a guideline that represents Con-
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gress’ clear policy choices.53 The last circuit’s position, while not preclud-
ing or condoning a policy rejection of the child pornography guideline, 
expresses a generic deferential stance to congressional choices on punish-
ments, while also opining that legislative preferences need not be empiri-
cally based.54
Statistical analyses of the Commission’s 2012 dataset indicate that this 
circuit split is correlated with the length of sentences being imposed. The 
mean sentence in the circuits supporting a policy rejection of the child 
pornography guideline was about eight years, while in the other circuits it 
was eleven years. These numbers suggest that the dispute over whether a 
court may reject the child pornography guideline is related to the lack of 
national uniformity. Widespread disparities have caused conflict among 
various institutions in the federal justice system.
Institutional Conflicts
To be clear, some of the conflicts discussed in this chapter are not necessar-
ily limited to child pornography sentencing. There is an ongoing, broader 
discussion about which federal sentencing institutions may engage in poli-
cymaking and, more specifically, whether one of those institutions may 
trump the others if there is a conflict. Some believe that Congress, as the 
elected representative body of the people, naturally holds the overriding 
power.55 Others prefer the Sentencing Commission, pointing to its institu-
tional advantages for empirical analysis and professional judgment, though 
not necessarily eschewing congressional oversight.56 If the guidelines are 
more akin to mere “sentencing suggestions,” as some have suggested is the 
current state of affairs, then perhaps the Commission should be abol-
ished.57 Still other experts insist that sentences are most just when judges 
are able not only to consider the Commission’s expertise, but also to gather 
relevant information and engage in individualized sentencing.58
Notwithstanding the larger debate over federal sentencing, child por-
nography sentencing presents its own singular tensions. Congress contin-
ues to press for increases in penalties for child pornography crimes, as 
well as for decreased judicial discretion. The federal judiciary pushes in 
the opposite direction by varying downward from guideline recommen-
dations in a significant portion of cases. In a politically charged hearing on 
the state of federal sentencing after Booker, the then- chair of the House 
Judiciary Committee remarked that “[a] criminal committing a federal 
crime should receive similar punishment regardless of whether the crime 
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was committed in Richmond, Virginia, or Richmond, California. And 
that’s why I am deeply concerned about what’s happening in federal sen-
tencing.”59 He focused not just on regional differences in sentences gener-
ally, but on high disparity rates for particular crimes, singling out child 
pornography sentencing as having the most extreme downward variance 
rate among federal judges. The conflict has caught the attention of the 
media, with numerous newspapers, magazines, radio shows, and other 
news outlets reporting on it. For example, legal reporters have recognized 
that Congress has micromanaged sentencing policy to an exceptional de-
gree with child pornography penalties.60
Other constituencies interested in the debate and in its resolution are 
obvious: prosecutors, victims, the defense bar, and defendants themselves, 
all with sometimes conflicting interests. The American Bar Association 
has called for an overhaul of the child pornography guideline, claiming 
that its sentences are too severe and disproportionate considering they 
yield sentences longer than drug trafficking, white- collar crime, and some 
offenses involving luring children into sexual acts.61 At a recent congres-
sional hearing, an American Bar Association representative further 
opined that federal judges and the Commission ought to have a more 
symbiotic relationship; if the judiciary is consistently varying from a 
guideline, that fact should be considered significant in convincing the 
Commission that changes are required.62 The Department of Justice also 
seeks an overhaul of the relevant guidelines, believing them to be out-
moded, though it is not necessarily supporting the downward variance 
rate or a reduction in sentence severity overall.63
For its part, the United States Sentencing Commission appears torn 
between the constituencies it was designed to serve.64 On the one hand, 
the Commission seeks to provide relevant guidance to federal judges in 
crafting sentences and thereby fostering national uniformity. It clearly rec-
ognizes the high variance rate and is displeased with it. A comprehensive 
review of the validity of the child pornography guideline has been a listed 
priority of the Commission since 2009, and the agency in 2013 officially 
expressed its continuing investigation into possible changes. On the other 
hand, the Commission was created by Congress. Although Congress del-
egated significant authority to the Commission, the Commission recog-
nizes that Congress retains ultimate authority over sentencing policies 
and guidelines.65 In its recent lengthy report specifically addressing the 
child pornography guideline, the agency reminds Congress that one of the 
Commission’s legal duties is to examine sentencing data and to make 
modifications in light of feedback from the judiciary, including from their 
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sentencing decisions, which in the area of child pornography have been 
dominated by a high variance rate in recent years.66 Because the Commis-
sion evidently believes that prior congressional action in this area con-
strains it from overhauling the child pornography guideline on its own, it 
politely asks Congress for official approval to do so. Curiously, the Com-
mission seems to have taken a conciliatory position in this respect. In-
stead of providing specific recommendations regarding discrete offense 
levels and SOC point adjustments, it vaguely refers to potential changes. 
Further, instead of offering modifications that would not infringe upon 
prior congressional dictates, the report seems to invite legislative approval 
before any official action is taken. In sum, the situation seems at a stand-
still, with the agency awaiting some clear congressional response.
Unfortunately, the Commission’s ambivalent position in its recent re-
port means that a significant variance rate and sentencing disparities will 
continue in the meantime. Indeed, the Commission’s stance may actually 
create further trouble. Jurists who find fault with the guideline may seize 
upon the Commission’s suggestions and experiment in implementing 
them in actual cases, creating even greater discrepancies in sentences na-
tionwide for similarly situated offenders. The fact that there is a circuit 
level conflict on a major legal issue only muddies the situation.
Overall, this chapter provides reasoning, empirical data, and legal ar-
guments that substantiate wide disparities in sentencing for federal child 
pornography offenses. Clearly, the various sentencing institutions in the 
criminal justice system are divided in judgments on culpability, which will 
lead to continuing differences in opinion on sentencing policy between 
and within institutions. In addition to the political controversies and em-
pirical questions discussed, two further perspectives may be useful in as-
sessing the current conflict over federal sentencing of child pornography 
offenders: a comparative analysis of criminal sentencing from other 
American jurisdictions and competing ideological perspectives.
Comparative Perspectives
Comparing sentences across jurisdictions creates a fuller understanding of 
the various political and empirical positions of punishment in our federal-
ist system. The U.S. Sentencing Commission is generous in making avail-
able much of its data for researchers to analyze, including the statistical 
analyses in this chapter. Other sentencing agencies are not as transparent, 
which unfortunately makes it difficult to conduct a comparative analysis of 
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sentences across multiple American jurisdictions. But there are alternative, 
albeit weak, methods, to ferret out where the federal system stands in com-
parison to other jurisdictions. One potential comparator is within the fed-
eral government itself: the military. The military justice system operates 
substantially autonomously from the criminal system for civilians. For the 
limited purposes needed here, the most relevant distinction is that military 
sentencers are not bound by the Commission’s policies and guidelines. 
Though there is no publicly available database of sentences in the armed 
forces, much anecdotal evidence suggests that sentences in the military for 
child pornography offenses deviate from the civilian regime. A review of 
available case law in the past few years indicates that sentences for child 
pornography crimes in the military system are relatively minimal— 
generally far less severe than in the civilian system. Across the case opin-
ions, sentences of less than two years appear to be the most common (e.g., 
ninety days,67 four months,68 five months69). The case law review suggests 
that sentences greater than that rarely are present unless additional crimes 
were involved, such as actual child molestation.70
No database exists, either, that permits an easy comparison of actual 
sentences imposed for child pornography offending in the various states. 
Two reporters have investigated potential differences in their geographic 
areas. Comparing federal sentences with Pennsylvania state sentences for 
federal and state child pornography offenses, one reporter found that half 
of those sentenced in Pennsylvania state court for child pornography of-
fenses in 2009 did not receive any sentence involving incarceration, while 
of those that did receive some prison term the longest sentence was ap-
proximately eight years. The reporter compared these results to the aver-
age seven- and- a- half- year sentence in federal courts during the same time 
period.71 A journalist for a Louisville, Kentucky, paper compiled years of 
statistics to compare sentences for federal child pornography offenders 
adjudicated in the local federal district court, not with state child pornog-
raphy defendants, but with child sexual molestation defendants sentenced 
by the local state court.72 He concluded that the average sentence for child 
pornography offenders in the area’s federal district (from 2006 to 2011) 
was almost four times as long as the sentence received by offenders in the 
local court for sexually assaulting children.
This author’s own analysis of Texas data for the offenses of possession 
and promotion of child pornography offenses yielded an average sentence 
of almost ten years, though with a range of six months to life. Yet this sta-
tistic is not exactly comparable considering it was a dataset of all offenders 
incarcerated in Texas state prisons as of February 2013. It included prison-
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ers who were sentenced from 1997 onward and did not include probation- 
only sentences or those no longer in prison, and the dataset thus may have 
overrepresented lengthy sentences. A better comparison may be the aver-
age sentence imposed: The fiscal 2012 federal average was ten years. The 
average sentence imposed in Texas for child pornography offenses from 
January 1, 2012, through February 5, 2013, was about seven years. Again, 
though, this figure does not include probation- only sentences or those 
who were already released or for some other reason not then incarcerated 
in Texas’ prisons despite being sentenced during that time period.
In sum, these small- scale and simplistic comparisons yield different 
conclusions. Comparing federal and state child pornography offending 
sentences, the Texas experience appears to be closer to the federal one, 
while the Pennsylvania sentencing system appears to impose far more le-
nient sentences. The local Kentucky review showed that federal child por-
nography defendants received sentences on average about four times as 
long as state defendants did for contact molestation crimes, suggesting the 
federal system is much more punitive for noncontact child sexual exploi-
tation offenses.
An alternative, though admittedly also somewhat lax, method for a 
comparative analysis is to consider statutory sentencing schemes across 
state systems. Recall that the penalties in the federal system generally 
range from probation to ten years for possession and five to twenty years 
for receipt, distribution, and transportation (not including increases for 
prior sexual offending). A review of the fifty states’ sentencing schemes for 
nonproduction child pornography crimes shows that there are widespread 
inconsistencies— some to a dramatic degree— in potential punishments 
across the country for child pornography crimes.73 The comparative anal-
ysis herein focuses on distribution- type offenses, though many states gra-
date sentences for possession offenses much lower.
Overall, minimums and maximums vary to large degrees. In many in-
stances, the ranges of punishments between different states do not even 
overlap. Many states permit sentences for distribution of no term of incar-
ceration, including, among others, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Other states appear to require 
some period of incarceration. For example, Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
New Jersey have five- year minimum thresholds, while the minimum in 
Massachusetts is ten years. In contrast, the maximum statutory penalty for 
possession and distribution in California is only one year, two years in 
West Virginia, and three years in Kentucky. Notwithstanding, several 
states permit more extreme punishments. Montana law allows sentences 
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up to one hundred years, Alaska up to ninety- nine years, and Wisconsin 
and Mississippi each sanction forty- year sentences.
The range of possible terms of incarceration in any state varies greatly 
as well. Montana and Alaska offer the widest sentencing schemes with 
ranges of zero to one hundred and zero to ninety- nine years, respectively. 
A few other states provide wide ranges of punishment as well. Idaho’s per-
mitted sentence ranges from zero to thirty years, Mississippi from five to 
forty years, Illinois from six to thirty years. To the contrary, a handful of 
states dictate very refined sentencing options, notably New Mexico with a 
fixed six- year sentence and, at even lower levels, North Carolina provides 
for twenty- to twenty- five months and Kansas dictates thirty- one to thirty- 
four months. In general, all of this evidence indicates substantial varia-
tions in statutory declarations of culpability for child pornography offend-
ers, as well as significant variations in sentencing, across the country for 
similar offenses based on both geographical and jurisdictional criteria.
Still, there is some evidence that the discrepancies in a guidelines- 
based system with sentences actually imposed may be unique to the fed-
eral system, at least in the child pornography area. In a recent survey of a 
representative sample of prosecutors nationwide who pursued child por-
nography cases, almost 80 percent reported that in their experience judges 
abided by state sentencing guidelines for child pornography possessors 
almost all the time.74
The foregoing reflects tensions among officials in defining appropriate 
punishments for child pornography offenders. Discrepancies in legal 
opinions between and within federal institutions and in sentencing laws 
across jurisdictions highlight the troubling results that otherwise similarly 
situated defendants may face differing sentences depending on the juris-
diction, region, and judge involved. Perhaps ideological contrast may help 
explain them as well.
Ideological Perspectives
Notwithstanding the importance of legal and empirical debates in ex-
plaining variations, the disparities in sentencing for child pornography 
offenders appear also to be founded upon fundamental differences in so-
ciopolitical perspectives. It appears that the diversity of opinions in sen-
tencing, which inherently also imbeds various judgments of culpability, is 
regularly tied to whether one concentrates upon depictions of sexual 
abuse of young victims or, instead, on the defendants and their behav-
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iors.75 Those who reiterate that the images depict the horrific sexual ex-
ploitation of the very young likely favor more severe punishments to ap-
propriately account for the tremendous suffering of the children. In this 
view, the consumption of the images operates to victimize the children 
over and over again. A lens focusing upon the minor victims seems often 
to embrace the market thesis, that consumption fuels a market for further 
production and the search for new bodies, necessarily leading to addi-
tional incidents of sexual abuse of children. Under this thesis, strong pun-
ishment is considered necessary to deter even the casual possessor. More-
over, the market thesis posits that the availability and consumption of 
material involving child victims creates a greater risk of harm to society in 
general by normalizing adult- child sexual relations or, even more broadly, 
normalizing a view of children as appropriate objects, perhaps also hold-
ers, of sexual desire. Thus, even outside the area of illegal pornographic 
materials, the proliferation of these images is thought to beget more sexual 
activity involving minors. Notably, in this society, the mere idea of chil-
dren engaging in sex is culturally abhorred. A victim- oriented focus can 
more easily ignore the offenders themselves. Because their crimes are re-
lated to the sexual exploitation of the most protected members of our so-
ciety, child pornography viewers are universally reviled and therefore un-
deserving of empathetic concern.
On the other hand, supporters of reduced punishment oftentimes ori-
ent more towards the offenders. For example, federal judges often describe 
individual defendants as good family men with decent jobs, positive com-
munity ties, and no prior offenses.76 Again, statistical runs using the Com-
mission’s 2012 dataset supports the observation that federal child pornog-
raphy offenders as a group are far different than other federal defendants 
on certain risk- relevant measures. The vast majority of them are white 
males, American citizens, highly educated, and with no criminal history. 
Even the demographic characteristic of age indicates a less risky group; 
the mean age of child pornography defendants is forty- one years, and over 
one- quarter were age fifty and above. An additional explanation given 
why these defendants fail to pose a substantial risk to children is that the 
conduct is not necessarily indicative of deviant sexual interest in children; 
other, less nefarious motivations are in play. These alternative motivations 
include an original interest in adult pornography that led to collecting 
child pornography, in part because of technological advances in modern 
times.77 The Internet offers what has been called the “triple A engine”— 
anonymity, availability, and affordability— that has fueled addictive be-
haviors in online activity, including cybersex.78 Ease of access and efficient 
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downloading capabilities offered by new technologies mean that individu-
als online do not always control all the materials that are available to them 
or that become part of their digital collections. This perspective down-
plays the market thesis because the defendant’s individual collection is 
seen as contributing little to the global market for child pornography ma-
terials. It also reflects a judgment that there are gradations of culpability 
among downloaders.79 Evaluations about culpability variations essentially 
involve findings that possession is a lesser crime than distribution and that 
distribution is a more serious crime when it is done for profit than when 
no financial consideration is involved.80
Ideological divides occur, as well, in how to conceptualize the risks and 
the harms of child pornography. It is possible that proponents of harsh 
sentences are using child pornography consumption as a proxy to punish 
undetected child molestation. To the extent child pornography is plainly 
being used as a substitute, critics argue that child pornography crimes 
should not be embraced as a sort of inchoate crime, and that it is unjust to 
punish what a person has not done (here, child sexual assault) or may in 
some merely speculative sense do in the future.81 It may also be that the 
distinction between child pornography and child sexual assault has been 
negated by the new conceptualization of a broader umbrella of “child sex-
ual exploitation crimes” that consolidate contact crimes together with 
child pornography offenses in a single category. This umbrella widens the 
lens to defining all those who engage in child sexual exploitation crimes as 
directly responsible for the harms caused to child victims, whether or not 
the offenders had physical contact with them. Indeed, child pornogra-
phers may even be characterized as having greater culpability considering 
that their crimes likely involve not one but many victims.82
Conclusions
As long as the Commission and the guideline structure remain intact, per-
haps the preferred philosophy is to value the advantages that can be ob-
tained. The Commission’s data analysis can still foster coherent standards 
reflecting national uniformity. At the same time, the decisions of individ-
ual judges can act as checks on Congress and the Commission, while, in 
turn, Congress’ ability to enact mandatory minimums that are generally 
enforceable on all institutions constitutes a substantial check.83 Indeed, 
experts worry there might be a causative link— that if district judges exer-
cise their Booker discretion and/or Kimbrough- style policy rejection to 
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vary in a high rate of cases, it may lead Congress to react by implementing 
mandatory minimum sentences84 or even abolishing the Commission 
and/or the guidelines entirely.85 Such fears reflect what has already hap-
pened in the area of child pornography sentences.86 This struggle over 
power between the sentencing practices of judges and the potential for 
Congress’ corresponding backlash, while theoretically applicable to the 
entirety of federal sentencing, is at its zenith with the child pornography 
guideline. The sheer magnitude of the downward variance rate, together 
with Congress’ unique and repeated attempts to counteract judicial dis-
cretion, is most striking with this guideline today. This makes the child 
pornography guideline important for the various reasons discussed 
herein, but also means it is at the cutting edge of federal sentencing policy 
for the future. At its core, the debate is about defining just punishment for 
a crime in which legal and ideological opinions are in direct conflict.
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